The Fabian Strategy
Diversionary Tactics in the Second Punic War
The diversionary tactic, known as the Fabian Strategy, was implemented during the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE) following the Carthaginian general Hannibal’s devastating victories in Italy. This strategy itself was a major diversion from the traditional Roman preference for immediate, decisive, pitched battles. The general responsible for this strategy was a person defined by prudence, steadfastness, and strategic brilliance, often in direct opposition to the impulsive nature of Roman military culture at the time. Indeed, this general was the embodiment of strategic restraint and civic virtue—a man who had the wisdom to avoid fighting on his enemy’s terms and the courage to endure public ridicule for the ultimate good of the Roman Republic.
While the tactic was effective, it was far from being the first use of diversion in warfare. The oldest, most primitive tactics—including ambushes, raids, and feigned retreats—rely entirely on diversion and surprise. These were common in tribal societies and are documented in very early military histories. For example, the feigned retreat tactic is mentioned in accounts of ancient cavalry warfare, and it is a classic form of battlefield diversion. Moreover, the ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu, whose Art of War predates Fabius by over 300 years, explicitly stated: “All warfare is based on deception.” His entire philosophy is founded on indirect and diversionary methods, such as using feints, decoys, and avoiding strong points to wear down the enemy’s will and strength.
The general who introduced this tactic and whose name it bears is Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus. He was famously given the nickname “Cunctator” (meaning “The Delayer” or “The Laggard”) by the Roman people and his political opponents, who found his cautious approach to be cowardly and frustrating. Livy recounts the strong criticism Fabius faced from his second-in-command, Minucius Rufus, who was eager for a conventional battle (Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, Book XXII, Chapter 14). As recorded by the ancient historians, Fabius’s intent was to use time to Rome’s advantage against an enemy far from home and cut off from supplies, believing that wisdom and systematic strategy, not a rash risk, would eventually succeed.
Before and during the time of Fabius, nomadic groups like the Scythians were famous for their highly mobile, mounted tactics. They would frequently use hit-and-run attacks, feigned retreats, and evasive maneuvers to wear down and confuse their heavier, slower opponents. Fabius had a long political and military career, including having served as consul twice before his dictatorship in 217 BC. It is possible that he had first-hand knowledge of these kinds of tactics. Either way, Fabius was an experienced, if cautious, Roman general, which allowed him to adapt his command to a completely new and unconventional challenge.
Fabius refused to stake the future of Rome on a single, general engagement with Hannibal’s superior army, and he was wise not to do so. Plutarch notes that Fabius “did not purpose to fight out the issue with him, but wished, having plenty of time, money, and men, to wear out and consume gradually his culminating vigour, his scanty resources, and his small army.” (Plutarch, Parallel Lives, Life of Fabius Maximus, Chapter 5)
Fabius kept his forces on high ground and shadowed Hannibal’s army, sending out smaller units to attack the Carthaginian foraging parties to limit their access to food and resources. Livy and the Greek historian, Polybius, both describe how Fabius would follow Hannibal “not far from Arpi,” avoiding close combat but never losing sight of him (Livy, Ab Urbe Condita , Book XXII, Chapter 13 and Polybius, The Histories, Book III, Chapter 90).
Fabius ordered the burning of crops and the movement of villagers into fortified towns to prevent Hannibal’s troops from gathering supplies, thereby forcing a war of attrition. This tactic is known to us today as a “scorched earth policy.”
The Fabian strategy was more a product of prudent, tactical necessity in the face of an unprecedented crisis, rather than a doctrine drawn from a specific previous master or text. It was an innovation born out of a desperate need to survive. The overall impact of the Fabian strategy was profound, as it was the critical factor that preserved the Roman Republic’s military strength and will to fight after Hannibal’s initial, devastating victories.
This persistent strategy of bleeding Hannibal slowly while simultaneously attacking his allies and securing Spain allowed Rome to eventually gain the upper hand. While Scipio Africanus ultimately defeated Hannibal at Zama, it was the Fabian strategy that ensured Rome survived the invasion long enough to create that opportunity.
***
Bibliography and recommended reading
Polybius. The Histories. Translated by W. R. Paton, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1922–1927.
Livy. Ab Urbe Condita Libri (History of Rome from its Foundation). Translated by B. O. Foster, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1919–1959.
Plutarch. “Life of Fabius Maximus.” Plutarch’s Lives. Translated by Bernadotte Perrin, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1914–1926.
Hoyos, Dexter. Mastering the West: Rome and Carthage at War. Oxford University Press, 2015.
A Companion to the Punic Wars. Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.